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Faculty of Arts in Paris were much more cordial than they were with his own fellows in Theology. He considered it his business to in terpret the New Aristotle in a Christian sense. He did not think it proper for a theologian to write about something which was altogether profane,1 but he was not above making use of the spoils of the Egyp tians. Here are a few instances of his use of these Aristotelian modes taken from his authentic works.
I. TH E CONCRETE VS. THE ABSTRACT
In modern linguistics, words are supposed to stand for things directly on a one-for-one basis. " Man " is a comparatively distinct mode of signification for Socrates, " humanity " is a confused mode. In the scholastic tradition, terms stand for thoughts, and thoughts stand for things.2 There is some correspondence, of course, between the external word as a sign of the internal word, and the internal word as a sign of the thing itself. The concept is based on reality. But this mediation of thoughts between words and things allows for a multiple difference in the various modes of signification of the same one essence.
Modes of signification -terms -grammar is the logic of the external word " " understanding -concepts -logic is the grammar of the internal word " " being -things -metaphysics is the logic of the external world
Thus, there are two approaches to the modes of understanding. Modern philosophers pride themselves on taking their departure from things. The old Greeks started from the other end. Socrates began his philosophizing in wonder at the marvels involved in speech. Plato evolved his theory of ideas to account for the meaning of these terms. Aristotle extrapolated his meaning back into the things themselves. That was the basis for his metaphysics.
We call Socrates a man because of some relationship which he has to humanity ; we say he is living by reason of his life ; we speak of him as white on account of his whiteness ; he runs in virtue of the act of running, to run. Socrates may be said to " have " humanity, to " suffer " ills, to " receive " praise, to " be subjected to " many forms. But he is not humanity, nor whiteness, nor praise, nor any of those particular forms. There is a built in difference in these modes of signification which we respect in our manner of speech. What is this relationship of man to humanity, of white to whiteness, and so on ?
1.
Plato hypostatized an Ideal Humanity, a Subsistent Whiteness, etc., to account for this difference. According to him, Socrates was called a man inasmuch as he partook of a separated Humanity, just as he may be said to be illuminated inasmuch as he shares in the light of the sun.
Aristotle denied the separate existence of forms such as humanity and whiteness. He could not see how such forms could exist apart from matter and still bear a transcendental relation to matter in their very definition. According to him, humanity is nothing more than the specific form of Socrates mentally abstracted from Socrates. Life is abstracted from a living being, the act of running is abstracted from someone running, and so on. Humanity, life, etc., are all principles of Socrates. They are logical principles. We call Socrates a man, because we recognize in him the form of humanity ; we call him a living being, because of the form of life and esse, the act of being.
Dionysius, the pseudo-Areopagite, called the concrete subject, man, a quod est, and the abstract form, humanity, a quo est. Socrates is a man, a living being, white and running.
The opposition between these two different modes of signification shows up in predication. Socrates is a man ; he is not humanity. Predication is a sign of identity. It presupposes a real identity of the supposit denominated in the predicate with the supposit which is named in the subject. We express this identity in the terms of comprehension, when we say : No part is predicated of the whole. And we express this same identity in the terms of extension, when we say : The predicate of an affirmative proposition is particular.
No part can be predicated of the whole. Socrates is not his arm, nor his leg ; neither is he his humanity, nor his whiteness. Humanity and whiteness are closed concepts.1 They prescind in the sense of positively excluding every other intelligible note save those which are contained in their own comprehension. And Socrates is not merely humanity, nor whiteness; he is much more than any mere catalogue of abstract perfections.
We can say, Socrates is a man, however, and, Socrates is white. This is a different mode of signification. Man expresses the same essence as humanity, but it expresses that essence as a whole supposit. It stands as an open concept which includes not only the animality and rationality implicit in Socrates' humanity, but his whiteness also, his act of running, and every other individuating note in some vague confused way at least. Otherwise, man could not be predicated of Socrates, as it is. No part can be predicated of the whole. Humanity is only a part of the comprehension of Socrates ; man is a name for the whole supposit.
The predicate of an affirmative proposition is particular.2 This rule expresses that same identity of a predicate with its subject, only it does so in the terms of extension. Just as man is an open concept which must grow to include all of the other intelligible notes in the comprehension of Socrates, so too, in its extension, man must shrink to a corresponding part of the two billion men in the world. It must become particularized. The extension of a term varies in inverse ratio with its comprehension. Otherwise, the supposit which is called man in the predicate would not be identical in its extension with its subject, Socrates.
There are two apparent exceptions to this rule. With a singular predicate, e.g., Marcus Tullius is Cicero, the predicate is already particularized. In a complete definition, the extension of the pre dicate is automatically coterminous with that of its subject. The complete identity in comprehension which a definition requires tailors the predicate to fit the extension of the subject also. It would be inconceivable that a predicate should have a greater ex 1. G. V a n R ie t , " La Théorie thomiste de l'abstraction," in Revue tension than that of its subject. A greater extension would mean a lesser comprehension. And no part can be predicated of the whole. S would simply not be P.
II. ACT VS. POTENCY
Act and potency are another dimension in the modes of significa tion. The concrete and the abstract differ as an essence considered as a whole differs from that same essence considered as a part. Act differs from potency as a first differs from a second in the priority of our knowledge.
Nothing is knowable except inasmuch as it is in act. 1 We cannot understand what an acorn is until we have seen an oak ; we do not know what blindness is except in the terms of sight ; we come to the knowledge of a vacuum when we see a bottle emptied. We learn about our faculties from their operations ; we reach the notion of a substance by way of its accidents ; we arrive at our concept of matter from a varied succession of forms. A genus would be meaningless except as a potency of species. No essence can be distinguished apart from its esse. No potency can be known save through its act. This is true in the experience of individuals. And it seems to be true also in the history of languages. Running is a much older word than runner, living than life, esse than essence.2 This distinc tion between act and potency is clear enough when it is considered apart from that between the concrete and the abstract. In practise, however, we usually find these different modes mixed up together.
ACT POTENCY ABSTRACT -esse the act of being essentia, essence, the kind of being We start with one who is actually running, a currens. We abstract the form currere, the act of running, id quo est from the concrete subject, id quod est, and we are left with a cursor, a runner, one who is still a member of the track squad even after the race is over and he is sitting down resting. A runner is in potency to run, just as cursus is the potency of currere. Similarly, starting with someone who is actually living, vivens, we abstract the form vivere, the act of living, and are left with the concrete potency, vivus, e.g., one of our posterity. We arrive at the abstract potency, life, vita, from its abstract act, vivere. Life, vita, is the potency of vivere, the act of living.
Ens, being, is the first object of the intellect.1 Ens est id quod est : being is that which is.* We abstract the form esse, the act of being, from the concrete subject, ens, just as we abstract humanity from man, and whiteness from that which is white. We are left with the concrete potency, res, thing. This concrete potency can be called a thing, inasmuch as it is fully thought out. The Latin res comes from reor, ratum est, and implies the ratification of a ratio, even though it is still short of esse. The abstract potency, essentia is a late Latin word which according to this analogy is not derived from res but from esse.
Theoretically, I suppose, we should be able to arrive at the abs tract potencies, cursus, vita, essentia, by abstracting these forms from their concrete potencies, cursor, vims, res. But, nothing is knowable except inasmuch as it is in act. And concrete potencies are not in act. Therefore, it seems, we come to the knowledge of the abstract potencies from the left on a horizontal level rather than vertically from the concrete potencies below. The etymology of essentia obviously indicates this derivation from esse, the act of being, rather than from res, the concrete thing. St. Thomas is continually pointing out the connection essence has to res, -they are both potencies * but he derives it from esse. " Essence means that through which and in which a being has its act of existing (esse)." 4 What is really real ? ' There are four possible answers, ens, esse, res, and essentia. The " real " of this question is used in predica tion ; therefore, that rules out the two abstract modes, esse and essentia. Ens, being, is the only concrete mode which is actual, because, ens, being, alone has an esse. Can res also be called " real " ? Res, thing differs from ens, being, as a potency differs from its act. Res, thing, is something which has been thought out ; it is the con crete subject of a ratio which has been ratified, ratum esse, for an esse. It is called a possible inasmuch as it may be said to be capable of receiving an esse. It is the object of the divine intellect ; it is a re flection of the divine essence itself.1 It would seem to be doing vio lence to language to deny that this res has any reality. That is the source from which we get the word " real Material substances are composed of matter, of form, and of esse. Immaterial substances do not have any matter ; hence, they cannot be composed of anything more than form and esse. The divine substance is Esse Itself Subsistent.2 God is pure act. The other immaterial substances are compositions of act and potency. The essence of Raphael, for instance, is a potency which does not include esse, the act of being, in its comprehension any more than it includes a mission, missurn esse to Tobias. If these perfections accrue to Raphael, they do so as logical accidents. Esse, the act of being is outside the comprehension of any creature. A creature has being, it has a share in esse, the act of being. God is Ipsum Esse Subsistens itself.
III. PU RE ACT VS. M IXED
What do we mean when we say, God is the Pure Act of Being Itself, God is Truth Itself, Goodness Itself ? We do not use this manner of speaking of anyone else. Socrates is a being, he is not being itself ; he is good ; but he is not goodness itself. What is the difference ?
Rabbi Moses ben Maimon argued from the fact that there was no composition in God to the conclusion that, therefore, we could not attribute any positive perfection to Him in an affirmative manner.8 All we could say of God truthfully, was what He is not. The " Living God " merely means that God is not like inanimate things ; the " merciful God " means that He is not cruel. Others claimed that St. Thomas avoided this agnosticism by making use of the modes of signification.2 In the via affirmativa, we abstract the notion of life from a vegetable or an animal ; in the via negativa, we purify this concept by denying of it all the imperfections with which it was accompanied in the vegetable or animal ; in the via eminentiori, we predicate this pure perfection of God.
And we predicate this pure perfection of God, not in the limited way in which it is participated in by creatures, but in the infinite way in which it exists in God. All of the colors of the rainbow are integrated in pure white light ; so too, all pure perfections are syn thesized in God. The color, red, does not exist in the light of the sun in the same way in which it exists in a vegetable. In God, pure perfections exist in the full scope of their infinity, one with Subsistent Being Itself. This is why we can say of God, that He is not only true, but that He is Truth Itself. The concrete mode of signification emphasizes His reality ; all of the realities which we experience in this life happen to be concrete material substances. The abstract mode emphasizes the perfection of the attribute ; the only way we can express the full perfection of the attributes we experience is to liberate them from their material subjects, e.g., mercy itself. The concrete mode does not do justice to the perfection of God's attributes ; the abstract mode does not do justice to their reality. Therefore, we need both. 3 By what right do we say that the Son is eternal, that a man creates, that a God was bom, suffered and died ? It is these same modes of signification which are at the back of the communication of idioms. A person can be denominated by any attribute which belongs to its nature.4 And this holds true whether there is one Person involved or three, one nature or two. The Second person of the Blessed Trinity possesses the complete divine nature ; there fore, He is eternal. He also happens to have acquired a human nature in the course of time ; therefore, He can be said to have been born, suffered and died. When He is denominated by this human nature in the subject, a Man can be said to create, etc.
IV . THE M ODES OF UND ERSTA ND IN G
The old Scholastics looked upon language as something more than a mere mirror of our thoughts. It blows those thoughts up and
1.
A l a n tj s a b I n r c l is , Theologicae Regulae, 21 (PL 210, 631) and 26 (PL 210, 633). 2. la, q.13, a.2.  3. Ibid., a.l, ad 2.  4. I l i a , q.16, a. 
2.
spreads them out over a wide surface, even as a prism refracts light. The big broad beams of a spectrum can tell us much about the com ponents of a beam of light, so too, the big broad diagram of a sentence on a blackboard can tell us much about the modes of understanding which are going on inside our minds. Speculative grammar is the logic of the external word, just as logic itself is no more than the grammar of the internal.
Priscian had formulated the rules of grammar. But Priscian did not explain the causes for these rules. Why is it that we speak the way we do ? This would depend upon our modes of under standing. These modes must be the same for all men. Hence, they must be fundamental in all language. Languages differ only as men do, accidentally.1
In his Commentary on Aristotle's P eri Hermeneias, St. Thomas points out how το όνομα, nomen, and τό ρήμα, verbum are under stood analogously in the two different operations of the intellect.5 Aristotle divided the object of the first operation of the intellect into ten supreme kinds of being according to meaning. He divided the object of the second operation into two formal parts according to their function, i.e., nomen, the name of the subject, and verbum, the word predicated about that subject.3 The Stoics transferred both of these terms to the first operation and called nomen a noun, and verbum a verb.
But there are other possible subjects of a proposition besides nouns. There are phrases and clauses, not to mention the verbal nouns called participles, the gerund, and the supine, the infinitive with and without the article, adjectives used substantively. And there are other predicated besides verbs. The active and the passive voice of a verb expresses only two of the Aristotelian praedicamenta.
Aristotle himself recognized ten.
These modes of understanding became the rationale for a whole literary genre which is practically lost today. The operation of an active faculty was expressed in the active voice, that of a passive faculty in the passive voice. A plant grows, but a sound is heard.
The principium quod of a passive faculty was expressed by an ablative of agent together with its preposition ; a principium quo was expressed by a mere ablative of means. The sound is heard by Socrates with his ears.4
When the principium quod required emphasis, it could be used as the subject, but the principium quo never. That was because the principium quod was the responsible agent of the operation. Socrates is the one who does the seeing with his eyes ; the eyes themselves were always kept in obliquo. No faculty could ever go about operating on its own accord. A faculty is not a responsible agent.
The Psalmist in the Vulgate cried out with his voice ; it was not the voice of the Psalmist which cries out, as it does in the new transla tion.1 We smile when children speak of inanimate things as though they could decide to up and break themselves, " The glass broke and yet our modern stylists are continually personifying such things, " The bell rang," or worse still, " shrilled." Cheapened metaphors lose all their effect, e.g., The hunter " snaked " his way through the grass. Poets for their own good reasons, may invert the logical order, " Green was my valley." But they can only do such things so long as a logical order exists. T o use a Chestertonian simile, you could not tarn a man upside down, unless his head belonged on top.
This studied manner of writing had been developing slowly through the Middle Ages. As Latin ceased to be the living language of the man in the street, it came to be a more and more precise instru ment in the hands of scholars. The art of letter writing, ars dictaminis, gave way to the art of the notary, ars notatoria, in Law. The rhythmic cadence of phrases employed in drawing up the Bulls of the Papal Curia and the official documents of the Imperial Chancery ranked as models. These rhythms were carried over into the hymns of the Breviary and the various cursus of the Collects in the Mass.2 Sound was made to fit sense.
St. Thomas did not have to write in the wooden framework of scholastic Latin. He was introduced to these highly stylized forms of what they called calligraphy while he was still a child at Monte Cassino.3 And it was his taste which was called upon to compose the liturgy for Corpus Christi, with its Lauda Sion, Adoro Te devote, etc. But he put all those elegancies aside when he came to construct his own philosophical prose. Here, he was writing for students. And many of those students were only beginners. He was willing to put his thoughts into a straight jacket, just so long as that format made those thoughts easier to follow. We can see why people thought he must have written the speculative grammar attributed to him.
